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Rostrum’s Law Review | ISSN: 2321-3787

Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms in Afghanistan after 2001

  • Authored by - Gaurav Kataria, Mohammad Ayub Yusufzai
  • Issue - RLR Volume VII Issue I

Abstract

Special attention is paid to electoral justice mechanisms during the designing or amendment electoral laws. Lack of existence or fault in the mechanism for handling electoral complaints and disputes causes the participation of the people in the elections to decrease or the results of the elections to be not accepted by the majority. Therefore, the best election laws and the best electoral system cannot succeed without the existence of an efficient electoral dispute resolution mechanism. The elections held after 2001 in Afghanistan show that the country faced unprecedented situations in the parliamentary elections in 2010 and the presidential elections in 2009, 2014, and 2019. This study highlights the gaps in the mechanisms of electoral dispute resolutions in Afghanistan. The research results show that efficient mechanisms, in line with the work of the Electoral Complaints Commission, were not explicitly provided in the Afghan Election Law. Afghanistan’s election law had limited the role of the Electoral Complaints Commission to handling complaints. This situation reduced the Electoral Complaints Commission from a dynamic and active organization to a passive one. A country’s legal system and culture play an essential role in the efficiency of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Comparative studies in this field modify that a specific electoral dispute resolution mechanisms model cannot be fully adapted because their effectiveness varies from country to country. In case of amendment or adoption of a new constitution, the Electoral Dispute Resolution Body should be established in Afghanistan and have the necessary competencies.

  1. Introduction

According to legal and political theories, the Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms are a monitoring system through which any electoral action and method can be challenged. The purpose of Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms is to ensure the integrity of the election within the framework of the law. The primary purpose of this system is to protect the electoral rights of voters and candidates. Therefore, electoral dispute resolution mechanisms play an essential role in protecting the fundamental rights of citizens and the evolution of the democratic process in a country, especially in developing and less developed societies.[1]

Electoral justice is the cornerstone of democracy; it guarantees both the legitimacy of the election process and the political rights of citizens. In addition, it plays an essential role in the continuation of the democratization process. Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, which ensure that political disputes arise through various mechanisms and ensure full compliance with the law, undoubtedly help institutionalize and develop democracy because fraud, irregularities, abuse, and conflict are inevitable in any election process.

Protests and complaints in the election process do not indicate the weakness and inefficiency of the electoral system but demonstrate the openness and democracy of the political system. The increase in election protests and complaints reflects the public’s awareness of their electoral rights and the electoral compensation process. Notably, this trend is challenging in countries where the electoral system and institutions are growing. Therefore, mechanisms for handling complaints and resolving electoral disputes are necessary because these mechanisms significantly impact the transparency of elections and democratic legitimacy.

In the elections held after 2001, it is clear that Afghanistan faced unprecedented situations in the parliamentary elections in 2010 and the presidential elections in 2009[2], 2014[3], and 2019. For example, in the parliamentary elections of 2010, the government took an unconstitutional action with the existence of two institutions responsible for the elections. The main reason for this unconstitutional action was the existence of ambiguity in the legal framework of the elections and the unexpected result of the elections in Ghazni province. The government did not accept the results announced by the election commissions, and the Supreme Court was asked to set up a special election court to hear complaints.[4]

As a result, the Supreme Court set up a special court to review election complaints. After national and international pressure, the tribunal ended with political upheaval. Although the laws amended in the 2014 presidential election and the institutions holding elections had been strengthened, Afghanistan again witnessed electoral disputes between the top candidates, fearing that the country would be in crisis. After domestic efforts failed, the electoral dispute, with foreign intervention and specifically with the cooperation and mediation of the US Secretary of State, resulted in a political understanding and the formation of a national unity government.

Among other factors, one of the obstacles to democracy in the country has been the lack of an efficient mechanism for handling electoral disputes. Therefore, it is necessary to study this issue.

  1. Research methodology

This paper is qualitative research, and data is collected through doctrinal research. According to this method, laws, decrees, domestic and foreign research articles, and books are studied, and data is collected.

This study’s essential purpose is to analyze Afghanistan’s electoral dispute resolution mechanism. To find the significant gaps in Afghanistan’s electoral dispute resolution mechanisms over the past 20 years and what lessons have been learned from Afghanistan.

What would be the critical steps regarding electoral adjudication if the conditions change again to revive a democratic system and elections.

  1. The Concept and Importance of Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The electoral dispute resolution mechanism includes procedures and institutions to prevent and resolve electoral disputes. In addition to the legal framework of elections, EDRM provides the necessary guarantees for free and fair elections. The design of an appropriate EDRM is essential to gaining democratic legitimacy and credibility in the electoral process. The goal of EDRM is not merely the implementation of laws but can effectively affect electoral players and election rules. EDRM is formed within cultural, social, historical, and political factors, so different  EDRM systems are used in other countries.[5]

Electoral Dispute Resolution is the handling and solving disputes belonging to the election process through election administration, law enforcement, courts, or any other institution. Electoral fraud, irregularities, or crimes can happen in any election process by candidates, voters, election administration, or government institutions.[6]

The purpose of the EDRM is to maintain the legitimacy, transparency of the elections, and the electoral rights of voters and candidates. Therefore, designing an electoral dispute resolution mechanism is critical in designing or reforming an electoral system.[7] The lack of an efficient EDRM for dealing with complaints, protests, and electoral violations damages the legitimacy and transparency of elections, undermines the legitimacy and acceptability of the political system, and can even lead to conflict in a country.[8]

Electoral justice mechanisms are formed for the following two primary purposes:

  1. A) Prevent violations of electoral laws and reduce electoral disputes.
  2. B) Returning the situation to normal, restoring the plaintiffs’ rights, and punishing the violators.[9]
  3. Types of Electoral Dispute Resolutions

Elections are one of the most important mechanisms for citizens to elect their preferred representatives in government positions and parliament. Protecting electoral rights is necessary to build citizens’ trust in the electoral process.[10] (Khawati, 2014, p. 8) It is because it supports democracy (Fortin-Rittberger Hrfst & Dingler, 2017, p. 351) and guarantees voters and candidates that if their rights and electoral freedoms have been violated, there is a mechanism to investigate these violations, irregularities, and electoral crimes. Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms must be strong enough to ensure that election rules are respected and that offenders punish if they violate the electoral laws.[11]

The electoral law should provide an effective mechanism for those who claim their voting rights have been violated. This mechanism involves securing rights through litigation. The legal basis of this right is section 3 of Article 2 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Accordingly, States Parties must provide mechanisms for redress in violation of the rights outlined in the Covenant.[12]

A country’s legal system and culture play an essential role in the effectiveness of electoral dispute resolution mechanisms. Therefore, it is impossible to suggest any specific electoral dispute resolution mechanism model.[13] Comparative studies in this area can be helpful, and learn a lot and use it to improve the mechanism of resolving electoral disputes. Still, we cannot fully adopt a mechanism for resolving electoral disputes because its effectiveness varies from country to country. For example, some developing countries have severe mechanisms for resolving electoral disputes, but it has not yielded good results. Nonetheless, some countries have had great success with a simple mechanism and prevented electoral disputes. For instance, Sweden, Norway, and Denmark hate heavy-handed regulation based on political culture. With simple mechanisms, they have been able to achieve great success. Therefore, using comparative studies, each country should design and implement a suitable mechanism for resolving electoral disputes, considering its political, cultural, and legal conditions.[14]

The design of an electoral dispute resolution system is related to several factors. Such as the scope of citizens’ rights and freedoms, the type and nature of the political system, the relations of the ruling powers and the degree of independence and separation of powers, the expansion and institutionalization of democratic institutions and culture, and the structure and competencies of electoral institutions, the level of electoral and political information Citizens, the type of electoral system, the role of electoral actors.[15]

Electoral dispute resolution mechanisms are divided into two categories: correctional and punitive. Electoral violations require corrective measures, but legal violations in elections or electoral crimes require punitive measures. These corrective and disciplinary measures are necessary to realize electoral rights. Without such a mechanism, the right to vote will be violated. Election dispute resolution mechanisms include the right to object to election results, the prosecution of perpetrators of crimes in the electoral process, and the right to compensation for electoral violations.[16]

Countries use a variety of methods to resolve electoral disputes. For example, in the United States, lawsuits are first filed in state courts, and if a Supreme Court decision is not upheld, an appeal is made to a federal court. In some developing countries, election complaints are subject to the jurisdiction of ordinary courts and special temporary or permanent commissions.[17] In most countries, the Electoral Commission handles election complaints in primary steps. Some believe that election commissions should handle the early stages of electoral litigation. It does not make sense to take all cases to ordinary courts. Because most courts are not familiar with enforcing election laws.[18]  Several countries have set up election courts. Brazil is a perfect example.[19]  The constitutional court handles the appeal process in countries with a constitutional court.[20]

  1. Electoral Dispute Resolution in Afghanistan since 2001

Afghanistan’s 2004 constitution is silent on the Electoral Dispute Resolution Mechanism. An institution to deal with electoral complaints and disputes was felt after the first presidential election in 2004. The decrees of the head of the interim administration regarding the elections did not address this issue.[21] The Joint Electoral Management Body (JEMB) appointed a post-election commission to handle the presidential election complaint, which was widely criticized.[22]

The 2004 election law vested the local staff of the Afghanistan Independent Election Commission (AIEC) as the primary authority to handle election complaints at the polling stations. Complaints about the vote count and the results could have been raised when the vote was counted or the results were announced. In case of dissatisfaction, the complainants could refer to the provincial office of AIEC or the AIEC central office.[23]

This institution was later included in the 2005 election law. The Electoral Complaints Commission (ECC) was established later based on the Electoral Law in 2005 for parliamentary elections. The ECC was composed of five members (a member of the Supreme Court, an appointed member from the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), and three foreigners who the UN Special Representative introduced for Afghanistan. Furthermore, the ECC was a temporary body before the election and dissolved two months after the announcement of the results.[24]

The 2010 electoral law changed the selection of the ECC members. The president was authorized to appoint the member of ECC in consultation with the speakers of the two houses of the National Assembly and the Chief justice of the Supreme Court.[25] Thus, the 2010 Electoral law removed the international representatives of the members of the Complaints Commission appointed by the UN Special Representative for Afghanistan and gave the authority to appoint the government, specifically the president.

It should be mentioned that this law changed the organizational structure of the ECC, but its powers were not changed. ECC’s primary duties were to address complaints against candidates and voters and solve related electoral disputes and violations.[26]  Also, the 2010 electoral Law authorized ECC central office to manage the electoral violations without complaints. Likewise, the central ECC office reviewed the decision of provincial ECC offices.[27]

Although the Afghan parliament officially took office after the 2005 parliamentary election[28], the election laws were passed through the legislative decrees of the President.[29]  After lengthy discussions, the National Assembly approved the election laws for the first time in 2013.[30] These two laws were: the electoral law and the law on the formation, duties, and competence of the Independent Electoral Commission IEC and the Independent Electoral Complaints Commission IECC.

Further, based on these laws, an Independent Complaints Commission was established in the center and provinces to handle electoral complaints and disputes.[31] The Central Election Complaints Commission was a permanent body, but the Provincial Complaints Commissions were temporary institutions investigating electoral complaints and conflicts.[32]

The law states that eligible members can submit their curriculum vita to the selection committee. The committee nominates 15 candidates with the highest legal criteria for the president. The country’s president had appointed five of them as members of IECC for six years. It should be noted that at least one qualified woman had to be selected from the five.[33] It can be seen here that the government, specifically the president, played a significant role in appointing members of election commissions, especially the Electoral Complaints Commission. In addition, the selection committee provided for in this law also consisted of government members (Speaker of the House of Representatives, Chairman of the Senate, Chairman of the Commission for Supervision of the Implementation of the Constitution). It consisted of only one person from the AIHRC and one from civil society related to elections.[34] Furthermore, according to the election law, the provincial commissions had three members nominated by the Central office of ECC and approved by the president.[35]

The Commission’s law allowed civil society representatives, political parties, the media, and national and international observers to attend ECC sessions that addressed electoral complaints and violations.[36] The powers of the commission were considered as in the previous two laws.

As a result of the challenges that arose in the presidential elections in 2014, the result was forming a national unity government.[37] One of the critical issues in the agreement of the Government of National Unity was the electoral reform, based on which the Electoral Reform Commission was established in 2015. [38]

After much study and discussions, the electoral reform commission proposed an electoral reform proposal to the government, the majority of which were accepted, except for the electoral system and the special election court.[39] The suggestions of the Electoral Reform Commission were taken into account in the 2015 electoral law published in official gazette 1207.[40] However, this law did not last, and on October 25, 2016, both electoral law, the IEC, and the ECC law were approved through a legislative decree and published in the official gazette number 1226.[41] Notably, some of the 2016 Electoral law was later amended and published in the official gazette number 1329.[42]

The third chapter of the Electoral Law of 2016 is about the Complaints Commission, and the eleventh chapter deals with election protests and complaints. The law authorizes the Electoral Complaints Commission to identify complaints of irregularities, irregularities, and electoral crimes.[43]

The Electoral Complaints Commission consisted of five members nominated by the selection committee to the presidency. The president had appointed three of the 15 nominees for a five-year term and two for three years.  The members of the Complaints Commission might be selected for subsequent periods of five years. In the amendment to this law, the political parties registered in the Ministry of Justice, instead of the selection committee, nominated one person, and civil society organizations related to the election nominated fifteen eligible persons, at least five of whom were women, as candidates for membership for electoral commissions. Then the president appointed the nominees as members of the ECC and IEC.[44]

  1. Content analysis

Afghanistan’s experience over the past 20 years shows that the mechanism for resolving electoral disputes has not been worked out precisely. Efforts have been superficial, and legislators and politicians have not been serious about creating an efficient mechanism. Most of the time, attempts have been made to make unadulterated adaptations that have been ineffective. The presidential and parliamentary elections held from 2004 to 2019 highlighted the practical and legal challenges and problems facing elections in Afghanistan. Controversies and Challenges in Elections Concerned Afghanistan’s Key Election Players and the International Partners. Thus, under pressure from the international community and civil society, the government amended the electoral laws.[45] The reforms made in 2009 were superficial and did not have the necessary effectiveness to reduce electoral challenges. The parliamentary elections of 2010 showed that the laws and electoral institutions in the country needed extensive, continuous, and planned reforms.[46]

Moreover, the reforms made in the following periods, especially in 2015, did not have the necessary effectiveness. The disputes in the 2018 parliamentary elections and the 2019 presidential elections exposed the weakness of the mechanisms for handling electoral complaints in Afghanistan. Fraud and election security in Afghanistan were out of control, partly due to the fault of the democratic culture and lack of accountability. So the reforms could improve the election process to some extent.  It can be learned that if a democratic system is to be re-formed in the country, an efficient electoral monitoring mechanism and a mechanism for resolving electoral disputes is necessary because these mechanisms increase the credibility of Afghan citizens about elections and lead to the gradual institutionalization of democracy.[47]

Precise procedures for the work of the Electoral Complaints Commission are not explicitly provided for in the Afghan election law. Afghanistan’s election law has limited the role of the Electoral Complaints Commission to handling complaints. This situation reduced the Electoral Complaints Commission from a dynamic and active state to a passive one.[48]

Although the Electoral Complaints Commission could investigate the electoral violation and frauds as soon as it became aware of the existence of complaints, based on the 2016 Electoral Law, the ECC was not obliged to identify and investigate frauds and violations on its initiative; Rather, if ECC wanted, it could, handle complaints, identify and investigate electoral irregularities, violations, and crimes on its initiative.[49]

Similarly, the violations in the election law are mostly related to the registration, voting, and counting process. Thus, the Electoral Complaints Commission’s oversight focuses on these three phases, while violations and irregularities can accompany the whole election process.

  1. Conclusion and recommendations

Every electoral system must establish a comprehensive electoral justice system to reduce and prevent electoral disputes. The more the rule of law is respected and the greater the law enforcement degree in a society, the fewer electoral disputes. Countries follow different ways of handling election complaints. According to the election law, Afghanistan has used a mixed method. Complaints of misconduct and misconduct were heard by the Complaints and Appeals Commission, which relates to electoral crimes. The task of the Complaints Commission in connection with electoral crimes was to recognize these crimes and refer them to the country’s judicial authorities. Given that electoral complaints require prompt prosecution, the referral of electoral crimes to ordinary courts will not be without its drawbacks. Filing complaints in ordinary courts is prolonged and may take months. On the other hand, in the list of electoral crimes, there are also crimes for which the determination of the fate of the elections depends on their consideration and the court’s decision. The future of the election will not be known until a court decision is reached. At the same time, the nature of the election requires that the grievance process be expedited and that the fate of the election is determined as soon as possible.

Given the shortcomings in the legal framework of elections regarding the mechanism for resolving electoral disputes, it seems that the proposal of the Special Electoral Reform Commission to establish a special electoral court as a permanent court within the framework of the judiciary is necessary for the future to investigate the electoral crimes.

The Electoral Complaints Commission was not active in election monitoring, so it is necessary that in case of amendment of the constitution or approval of the new constitution in the future, the executive authority of the elections should be submitted to the Independent Electoral Commission and Electoral Complaint Commission should monitor and solve the electoral disputes.

This manuscript is a part of the conference organised by School of Law, Lovely Professional University and the Authors are Mohammad Ayub Yusufzai, Research Scholar & Visiting Researcher at Utrecht University and Gaurav Kataria, Professor, School of Law, Lovely Professional University, Punjab.

References:

  1. Sahdati, Electoral Reform [Eslahat Entikhabati], 20, (2015).
  2. Jayakody, The State of Electoral Dispute Mechanisms in Afghanistan, 2, paper No. 1420, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (2014).
  3. Wilder, A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections, AREU Issue Paper, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (2005).
  4. Cookman, Assessing Afghanistan’s 2019 Presidential Election, 6, Paper No. 166, United States Institute of Peace (2020).
  5. Decision of the National Assembly of Afghanistan, No. 95, (2013).
  6. Petit, (2000). Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE Area: Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System, 5, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2000).
  7. Electoral Law, 2004, (Afghanistan).
  8. Electoral Law, 2005, (Afghanistan).
  9. Electoral Law, 2010, (Afghanistan).
  10. Electoral Law Amendment 2018, (Afghanistan).
  11. Ayub. & A. Deledda, (2009). Vetting Lessons for the 2009- 10 Elections in Afghanistan. 19The International Center for Transitional Justice a (2009) avialable at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Vetting-Lessons-2009-English.pdf , last seen 8/01/ 2022.
  12. Pierce, Independent and Credible Advising Afghan Security Forces During the 2019 Presidential Election, JFQ 100, 66, National Defense University (2021).
  13. Ghizaal H., Adjudicating Election Complaints: Afghanistan and the Perils of Unconstitutionalism, A Case Study of the Special Election Tribunal-2010, AREU 1404 E, 32, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unite, (2014).
  14. Alaee, A Comparative Study of the Electoral Justice Mechanism in England and the International Principles Governing Electoral Justice 19, Journal of Legal Research 297, 299 (2021). Availble at https://jlr.sdil.ac.ir/article_120710.html?lang=en , last seen on 10/ 3/ 2022.
  15. IECC and IECC Law 2015 (Afghanistan).
  16. IECC and IECC Law 2016 (Afghanistan).
  17. IECC and IECC Law 2013 (Afghanistan).
  18. Electoral Justice: An Overview of the International IDEA Handbook, ( 1st ed., 2010).
  19. Jesus O.H., Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook, (Ayman A. & Andrew E., 1st 2010).
  20. IDEA,International Obligations for Elections: Guidelines for Legal Frameworks, (D. Tuccinardi,1st, 2014)
  21. Elklit & A.Reynolds, (2002). The Impact of Election Administration on the Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Comparative Politics Research Agenda. 40 Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 86, 96 (2002). available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999584 , last seen on 10/ 3/ 2022.
  22. Kakar., Th. Kreamir & H. Raoofi, Evolution of the Executive Branch in Afghanistan: A look back and Recommendations on the way forward.AREU Issue Paper 1721E, 29, Afghanistan Research and Evoluation Unit, (2017).
  23. K. Karanja, (2021, May 7). The Role of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Solving Electorate Disputes: A Case Study of Electoral Justice in Kenya. SSRN,  available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3841271 last seen on 10/05/ 2022.
  24. A. Nkansah,., Dispute Resolution and Electoral Justice in Africa: The Way Forward., XLI, Africa Development (2016), avialable at https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/view/163585 last seen 20/04/ 2022.
  25. Sh. Khawati, Tribalism: The Nature of Afghan Elections and Democracy [Qaumkrasi wa Qabila salari: Maiyat Entikhabat wa Democracy Afghani ] in writing about Afghan democracy: Opportunities and challenges [Democracy Afghani: Forsata wa Chalisha], (1st, 2014).
  26. OSCE/ ODIHR, Handbook for the Observation of Election Dispute Resolution. (2019).
  27. Presidential Decree No 40, 2015.
  28. R, Dahl, Legal Frameworks for Effective Elections Complaints Adjudication Systems in Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Election 94 (Michael Clegg, 2011).
  29. Akbar. & Z. Akbar, Elections and Conflict in Afghanistan.International Policy analysis, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, (2011).
  30. A. Hussaini, (2015). Electoral Monitoring Mechanisms [Michanismai Nazarat Entikhabat]. Bonyad Andisha Quarterly, (2015) available at https://www.andisha.af/fa/journals/255/andisha-moaser2 , last seen on 8/2/ 2022.
  31. H. Johnson, The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy: The Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election, Reform Studies IV, Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (2019) availbel at https://aiss.af/persian/assets/aiss_publication/The_Myth_of_Afghan_Electoral_Democracy_The_Irregularities_of_the_2014_Presidential_Election(English).pdf
  32. N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Res. 2200A (XXI), (16/ 12/1966) available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights , last seen 15/ 4/ 2022.

[1] IDEA. Electoral Justice: An Overview of the International IDEA Handbook, 7( 1st ed., 2010).

[2] S. A. & Z Akbar,  Elections and Conflict in Afghanistan.International Policy analysis, 2, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, (2011).

[3] K. Kakar., Th. Kreamir & H. Raoofi, Evolution of the Executive Branch in Afghanistan: A look back and Recommendations on the way forward.AREU Issue Paper 1721E, 29,  Afghanistan Research and Evoluation Unit, (2017).

[4] Ghizaal H., Adjudicating Election Complaints: Afghanistan and the Perils of Unconstitutionalism, A Case Study of the Special Election Tribunal-2010, AREU 1404 E, 32, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unite, (2014).

[5] Jesus O.H., Electoral Justice: The International IDEA Handbook, 1-3, (Ayman A. & Andrew E., 1st ed. 2010).

[6] OSCE/ ODIHR,  Handbook for the Observation of Election Dispute Resolution.7 (2019).

[7] L. A. Nkansah,., Dispute Resolution and Electoral Justice in Africa: The Way Forward., XLI, Africa Development 97,101(2016), avialable at https://www.ajol.info/index.php/ad/article/view/163585  last seen 20/04/ 2022

[8] K. K. Karanja,  (2021, May 7). The Role of Alternative Dipute Resolution in Solving Electorate Disputes: A Case Study of Electoral Justice in Kenya. SSRN,  available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3841271 last seen on 10/05/ 2022

[9] Supra 7 at 1

[10] M. Sh. Khawati, Tribalism: The Nature of Afghan Elections and Democracy [Qaumkrasi wa Qabila salari: Maiyat Entikhabat wa Democracy Afghani ], 7, 8 in writing about Afghan democracy: Opportunities and challenges [Democracy Afghani: Forsata wa Chalisha], (1st, 2014).

[11] International Obligations for Elections: Guidelines for Legal Frameworks, 49,  (D. Tuccinardi,1st, 2014)

[12] U.N. General Assembly, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Res. 2200A (XXI), (16/ 12/1966) available at https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-civil-and-political-rights , last seen 15/ 4/ 2022.

[13] H. Alaee, A Comparative Study of the Electoral Justice Mechanism in England and the International Principles Governing Electoral Justice 19, Journal of Legal Research 297, 299 (2021). Availble at https://jlr.sdil.ac.ir/article_120710.html?lang=en , last seen on 10/ 3/ 2022

[14] J. Elklit & A.Reynolds, (2002). The Impact of Election Administration on the Legitimacy of Emerging Democracies: A New Comparative Politics Research Agenda. 40, Commonwealth & Comparative Politics 86, 96 (2002). available at https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999584 , last seen on 10/ 3/ 2022.

[15] Supra 15 at 299.

[16] D. Petit, (2000). Resolving Election Disputes in the OSCE Area: Towards a Standard Election Dispute Monitoring System, 5, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (2000).

[17] Supra 15 at 299.

[18] R, Dahl, Legal Frameworks for Effective Elections Complaints Adjudication Systems in Guidelines for Understanding, Adjudicating, and Resolving Disputes in Election 94 (Michael Clegg, 2011).

[19] Ibid at 101

[20] Supra 18 at 6

[21] F. Ayub. & A. Deledda, (2009). Vetting Lessons for the 2009- 10 Elections in Afghanistan. 19The International Center for Transitional Justice a (2009) avialable at https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Afghanistan-Vetting-Lessons-2009-English.pdf , last seen 8/01/ 2022.

[22] Ibid

[23] Art. 57, Electoral Law, 2004, (Afghanistan).

[24] Art.52, Electoral Law, 2005, (Afghanistan).

[25] Art.61, Electoral Law, 2010, (Afghanistan).

[26] Ibid Art.62 para 1-2.

[27] Ibid para 2-3.

[28] A. Wilder, A House Divided? Analyzing the 2005 Afghan Elections, AREU Issue Paper, 2, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (2005).

[29] Supra 6 at 5

[30] Decision of the National Assembly of Afghanistan, No. 95, (2013).

[31] Art 20 the IECC and IECC Law 2013 (Afghanistan).

[32] Ibid

[33] Ibid Art. 22 para 1-3-4.

[34] Ibid Art. 8 Para 5

[35] Ibid Art. 22 para 5-6

[36] Ibid Art. 24 para 3

[37] T. H. Johnson, The Myth of Afghan Electoral Democracy: The Irregularities of the 2014 Presidential Election, Reform Studies IV, Afghan Institute for Strategic Studies (2019) availbel at https://aiss.af/persian/assets/aiss_publication/The_Myth_of_Afghan_Electoral_Democracy_The_Irregularities_of_the_2014_Presidential_Election(English).pdf

[38] Presidential Decree No 40, 2015.

[39] A. Sahdati, Electoral Reform [Eslahat Entikhabati], 20, (2015).

[40] The IECC and IECC Law 2015 (Afghanistan).

[41] The IECC and IECC Law 2016 (Afghanistan).

[42] Electoral Law Amendment 2018, (Afghanistan).

[43] Supra 43 Art.28.

[44] Ibid Art. 29.

[45] C. Cookman, Assessing Afghanistan’s 2019 Presidential Election, 6, paper No. 166, United States Institute of Peace (2020).

[46] A. Jayakody, The State of Electoral Dispute Mechanisms in Afghanistan, 2, paper No. 1420, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit (2014).

[47] F. Pierce, Independent and Credible Advising Afghan Security Forces During the 2019 Presidential Election, JFQ 100, 66, National Defense University (2021).

[48] S.A. Hussaini, (2015). Electoral Monitoring Mechanisms [Michanismai Nazarat Entikhabat]. Bonyad Andisha Quarterly, (2015) available at https://www.andisha.af/fa/journals/255/andisha-moaser2 , last seen on 8/2/ 2022.

[49] Supra 43 Art. 90
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