Rostrum’s Law Review | ISSN: 2321-3787

Threshold Admissibility of electronic evidence: Anvar and Thereafter


Digital technologies are being increasingly used by us in everyday lives. As a natural consequence, various forms of electronic evidence is increasingly being used in both civil and criminal litigation. Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent case held that “the production of scientific and electronic evidence in court as contemplated under Section 65B of the Evidence Act is of great help to the investigating agency and also to the prosecution….in our view, the prosecution in possession of the best evidence, CCTV footage ought to have produced the same. In our considered view, it is a fit case to draw an adverse inference against the prosecution under Section 114 Illustration (g) of the Evidence Act that the prosecution withheld the same as it would be unfavourable to them had it been produced”.[1] Thus, non-production of electronic evidence may lead to adverse inference by Courts of Law and thus jeopardising the success of prosecutions.

Electronic records being more susceptible to tampering, alteration, transposition, excision etc.[2] In Anwar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer[3] (hereinafter ‘Anvar’), the Supreme Court of India, in its anxiety to ensure the credibility of electronic evidence held as under:

  1. Any documentary evidence by way of an electronic record under the Evidence Act, in view of section 59 and 65-A and 65-A, can be proved only in accordance with the procedure prescribed under section 65-B.”[4]
  2. “Sections 63 and 65 have no application in the case of secondary evidence by way of electronic record; the same is wholly governed by Sections 65A and 65B. To that extent, the statement of law on admissibility of secondary evidence pertaining to electronic record, as stated by this Court in Navjot Sandhu[5] case, does not lay down the correct legal position. It requires to be overruled and we do so.”[6]
  • “Only if the electronic record is duly produced in terms of Section 65B of the Evidence Act, the question would arise as to the genuineness thereof and in that situation, resort can be made to Section 45A – opinion of examiner of electronic evidence”.[7]

Indian investigation agencies have been gathering and relying upon several types of electronic evidence in the form of Call Detail Records (CDRs) of mobile phones/smart devices obtained from nodal officers of Service Providers by email, emails, CCTV records (digital/analog), Online content, electronic documents stored in the cloud, Mobile Phone Records, Hard Disks of Computers, pen drives etc. The appreciation of such electronic evidence has suffered a rude jolt after Anvar. The following paragraphs will list out some of the judgements that discarded electronic evidence at the threshold post Anvar:

    1. Call Records/CDRs: Before Anvar, there was no bar to adducing secondary evidence under the other provisions of the Evidence Act, namely Sections 63 and 65. Therefore, the call records can be proved by adducing secondary evidence either as per Section 63 of the Indian Evidence Act or by adhering to the conditions prescribed in Section 65B, Sub-section (2) or Sub-section (4).[8] However, post Anvar, in absence certification under Section 65B Indian Evidence Act, the same is clearly inadmissible and is being eschewed from consideration.[9]

The Court upon relying on the precedent set in the case of Anvar, held: “where the prosecution has relied upon the secondary evidence in the form of printed copy of the mobile phone call details, even assuming that the mandate of Section 65-B(2) of the Evidence Act had been complied with, in absence of a certificate under Section 65-B(4) of the said Act, the same has to be held inadmissible in evidence.”[10]

    1. Voice Recordings: with regard to the admissibility of the translated transcription of recorded conversation, the Apex Court by relying on the Anvar precedent held that as the voice recorder had itself not subjected to analysis, there is no point in placing reliance on the translated version. Without source, there is no authenticity for the translation. Source and authenticity are the two key factors for electronic evidence.[11]
    2. CCTV footage copied in CD/DVD: In Kishan Tripathi[12], Delhi High Court held that Original Hard Disk containing CCTV Footage is a primary evidence u/s 62 EA. In Manoj Kumar[13], Karnataka High Court held that secondary evidence of electronic record (consisting of the copy of the access control system in three sheets to prove the attendance of the accused, 21 photos and CD containing the CCTV footage) without certification under Section 65B of Evidence Act is inadmissible. However, the Delhi High Court in the case of Hunny v. State[14] admitted the CCTV footage and Photographs without certification under section 65B, on the basis of the testimony of the witness who installed CCTVs and provided the footage to Police. In this case, the witness in the cross examination, fairly admitted that the 65B certificate was not asked for by Police from him. During his deposition, the witness volunteered to add that he was ready to give the certificate that day too.
    3. Per Contra, in Puneet Malhotra v. State (Govt. of NCT Delhi)[15], the Delhi District Court was dealing with admissibility of oral evidence of competent witness with regard to the electronic record in the absence of Certificate u/s 65B of Evidence Act. The prosecution had claimed that the accused/appelant had sent obscene messages on the server of M/s India Times through landline phone number installed at his residence. The Nodal Officer of TATA Tele Services was examined as PW3 to prove the call detail records and SMS of the said landline phone number. Relying on Anvar’s case the District Court held that “the record produced by him (PW3) have been rendered inadmissible in evidence. The fact that PW3 deposed in his examination in chief in a manner akin to Section 65B of the Evidence Act is of no consequence.” As a result, the accused, who was facing charges of circulating certain obscene, objectionable messages to the victim and making indecent telephone conversations with her, was acquitted.
    4. The CD/DVD containing photographs: As the Compact Disk containing the photographs taken from the digital camera wasnt proved as per Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, the same was held inadmissible[16].
    5. Intercepted Conversations: In Jagdeo Singh[17], Delhi High Court held that if there is no certificate accompanying electronic evidence in terms of Section 65B i.e, such evidence is “inadmissible.” This evidence is inadmissible because it does not satisfy the requirement of the law under Section 65B EA. Such evidence cannot be looked into. Consequently, as far as the present case is concerned, the Court is satisfied that the intercepted telephone calls presented in the form of CDs before the trial court which were then examined by the FSL expert do not satisfy the requirements of Section 65-B EA. The net result is that the electronic evidence in this case in the form of the intercepted conversations and the CDRs cannot be looked into by the Court for any purpose whatsoever.
    6. Emails: In Kundan Singh v. State[18], the Delhi High Court observed that Emails are downloaded and computer output, in the form of paper prints, are taken every day. These emails may become relevant and important electronic evidence, subsequently. It is difficult to conceive and accept that the emails would be inadmissible, if the official i.e the person who downloaded them and had taken printouts had failed to, on that occasion or simultaneously record a certificate under Section 65B. In Nidhi Kakkar[19], the High Court of Punjab and Haryana observed that “the authenticity will have disclosed, in the context of emails, by recipient’s email id and the sender’s id and the relevant information available in the text of mails containing those details. The correctness and the exact reproduction in print out version could be still issues in the cross-examination and the Court will then consider whether the text could have been altered or morphed. There are dangers of fabrication but that shall be no ground for rejection of the whole record only because, it was possible fabricate false evidence.” Citing Section 22A Evidence Act which provides for  oral admissions as to the contents of electronic records with regard to the genuineness of the electronic record produced, the High Court observed that If, in a given case, the party denies having sent the email, the procedure must be to produce a certificate in the manner provided in sub section (4) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act reproduced above. That would have meant securing a certificate from the server of what the text contained to authenticate the text of transmission. There could be a danger of some person generating a fake mail by breaking into the email box of another and dispatch a mail to himself with incriminatory content to harm the other. If there is a doubt on such lines, it shall be possible to secure forensic details through the cyber crime branch of the State Police to find out the source of the particular computer, the place of dispatch, etc, with some effort. Fabrication of mail content is possible in conventional mails also, but it is a matter of evidence that could be subjected to cross examination to be tested for authenticity than a reluctance to admit them in evidence.” In the case of Ark Shipping Co. Ltd. vs Grt Shipmanagement Pvt. Ltd.[20], the Hon’ble High Court obtained an affidavit under Sec. 65B before admitting the email produced.
    7. Computer generated Bills: In Salman Salim Khan[21], the Bombay High Court relied on Anvar, the duplicate bills obtained from the computer system of the hotel (Exhibits-50A to 50D) were treated as the secondary evidence of the original bills either generated in the computer system and given to a customer or obtained, returned back from the customer after the payment. The High Court held that such secondary inadmissible in view of the mandatory pre-requirement to obtain a certificate as per Section 65-B (4) of Evidence Act.

The above judicial interpretation, although well-intentioned, introduced several rigidities in the process of introducing electronic evidence. The following are the major implications of Anvar:

    1. Mandatory Certificate: … the admissibility of the secondary electronic evidence has to be adjudged in the light of the principles laid down in Section 65-B of the Indian Evidence Act (IEA) and the proposition of law settled in the judgment of the Supreme Court in Anvar’s case and further clarified by the judgments of the Rajasthan[22] and Delhi High Courts[23]. If the secondary electronic evidence is not accompanied by a certificate issued in terms of Section 65-B of IEA, it is not admissible in evidence and any opinion of the examiner of electronic records (u/s 45A of IEA), or the deposition of the witnesses in court pertaining to the contents of such electronic record without Section 65-B compliance cannot be looked into by the courts.[24] Section 65B(4) doesn’t specifically mention that the conditions prescribed under the provision [sub section 2 of Section 65B] should be fulfilled only through a certificate. However, the judiciary indicated it to be so in the case of Anvar, by stating insisting for a certificate’.
    1. Closing the alternate gates for Admissibility: Since Anvar, except for production of a certificate as prexceibed by Section 65B, no other modes of producing computer output as evidence is left open as alternative options, thus the law has almost created a deadlock in this regard, by way of closing alternative options.2
    2. When to Certify? In Ankur Chawla v. CBI[25] the Single Bench of Delhi High Court held insisted that the 65B certificate must bear the date as that of the day on which such computer output [in this case CDs] were produced. However later in the case of Kundan Singh v. State,[26] the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court placing reliance on Anvar held that Section 65B does not require simultaneous certification of electronic record. However, this is also a  High Court Judgement. Clarity from Hon’ble Supreme Court in this regard is essential.
    3. Who will Certify? The certificate under section 65B of IEA must be signed by a person “occupying a responsible official position in relation to the operation of the relevant device or the management of the relevant activities”. In Shradha Shipping Co,[27] the Bombay High Court held that the private consultant was not the rightful author of the certificate as he was not holding a responsible official position. In this case, the private consultant was neither the author of the log sheets or the invoices, nor did he have free access to the computer or the computerized records of the complainant, which were admittedly maintained under due password. Further, the certifying authority should also satisfy the threshold of knowledge about the functioning of the computer. For instance, in Jagdeo[28], the court set the threshold as a person ‘conversant with the operation of a device used’.[29] The Certificate contemplated under Section 65B (2)(a) is a Certificate by a person having lawful control over the use of the computer and not by a person who actually operates the computer.[30] In such a situation, difficulties also arise with regard to certification of computer output from the devices owned/used/controlled by the accused. Similarly, if the Systems Administrator himself is an accused, who is competent to certify? If the accused certify the computer output because the device is owned and controlled by him, will it not amount to testimonial compulsion?

Section 65B of IEA:

Sections 65A and 65B were introduced in the chapter relating to documentary evidence. Section 65A provides that contents of electronic records may be admitted as evidence, if the conditions provided in Section 65B are complied with. Section 65B provides that electronic records shall be considered as documents, if the computer which produced the record had been regularly in use, the information fed into the computer was part of the regular use of the computer and the computer had been operating properly. It further provides that all computer output shall be considered as being produced by the computer itself, whether it was produced directly or indirectly, whether with human intervention or without. This provision ensures that computer evidence will not be treated as hearsay, if the conditions specified above are complied with. Thus, with the amendments introduced in the statute, electronic records have been made admissible in evidence without the need to produce the original.[31]

It may be noted that the Section starts with a non obstante clause. Thus, notwithstanding anything contained in the Evidence Act, any information contained in an electronic record which is printed on a paper, stored, recorded or copied in optical or magnetic media produced by a computer shall be deemed to be a document only if the conditions mentioned under Sub-section (2) are satisfied, without further proof or production of the original. The very admissibility of such a document, i.e., electronic record which is called as computer output, depends on the satisfaction of the four conditions under Section 65B (2).[32]

It has to be borne in mind that section 65B only relates to the admissibility of electronic records. It authenticates the genuineness of the copy/computer printout and thus absolves the parties from producing the original. This section only makes the computer output admissible on complying with the requirements of the section. It does not prove the actual correctness of the entries and does not dispense with the proof or genuineness of entries made in such electronic records. Furthermore, there is no presumption regarding the genuineness of the entries in electronic records.[33]

Best Electronic Evidence:

The Information Technology Act, 2000 (“IT” Act) introduced certain amendments in the IEA, to make provisions for admitting evidence by way of electronic records. Explanation to Section 3 was added to incorporate all electronic records in the definition of ‘Documentary Evidence’ under IEA.

The fundamental principle of the common law is that the best evidence – the original document – must be offered to the court in proof of the facts in issue or relevant facts. Primary evidence is considered to be the “best evidence” since it is the best available corroboration of the existence of a fact.[34]

Not every CD/DVD is Secondary: Paragraph 24 of Anvar reads: “The situation would have been different had the appellant adduced primary evidence, by making available in evidence, the CDs used for announcement and songs….That is not the situation in this case. The speeches, songs and announcements were recorded using other instruments and by feeding them into a computer, CDs were made therefrom which were produced in court, without due certification.” It is clear that the Apex Court distinguished between CDs used for announcements and songs, and CDs, which were later made from the computer. It held that while the first CD would be primary evidence, not subject to section 65B, the CD made from the computer is secondary evidence and hence, subject to section 65B. Though the court touches upon this issue through this hypothetical, it does not complete the task of defining ‘original’.[35]

Section 65B almost completely replicated section 5 of the Civil Evidence Act 1968 of the UK (CEA). The anachronism prevalent in the imitation of section 5 of the CEA is apparent because section 5 of the CEA itself had already been repealed in 1995—five years prior to the introduction of section 65B in 2000. The Law Commission of UK opined in 1993 that these admissibility requirements not only posed significant fetters for reliance on electronic documents. Therefore, it recommended that ‘no special provisions should be made in respect of the manner of proof of computerised records’… The legislative direction to these suggestions was given in the form of the CEA, 1995, that also excluded special provision on electronic records… In 1997, similar reforms were suggested for the admissibility of electronic evidence in a criminal trial… In pursuance of the Law Commission’s recommendations, the Justice and Criminal Evidence Act, 1999 specifically barred the application of any technology-specific conditions for the admissibility of electronic records.[36] The 1999 Act provides that a presumption now exists that the electronic device producing the evidential document in legible permanent form was working properly at the material time and is admissible as real evidence. This presumption is subject to rebuttal by the production of evidence to the contrary. Should this occur, the party seeking to produce the electronic or automated document in evidence must satisfy the court that the computer was in fact working properly at the material time.[37]

Primary-Secondary dichotomy in digital evidence:

Section 65B makes admissible the computer output ‘without further proof or production of the ‘original’ (emphasis added). This means that section 65B draws a distinction between an original and a copy. Therefore, the section clearly distinguishes between original and computer output.[38]

Though Section 65 is referring to “Secondary” documents in paper form, there is no such distinction made as to the electronic document. There is no need to distinguish Primary and Secondary and all documents need to be interpreted by a human being which takes the form of a Section 65B certificate. A “Hard disk” which may contain an electronic document also cannot be considered the “Primary Document” since it is only a “Container” and the real Electronic document is an expression in binary language which cannot be read by a human being and needs to be interpreted with the assistance of a binary reading device (Computer + operating system +Application)[39]

Section 65B created an artificial distinction of primary and secondary in digital/electronic records. In the context of electronic records, the question of what is an original record for the purposes of the Best Evidence Rule is not as clear cut as it is with corresponding paper equivalents.[40] Unlike the paper environment, “in the electronic environment, the original of a message is indistinguishable from a copy..”.[41]

Keeping the above difficulty in mind, the lawmakers in several jurisdictions, defined the original/primary electronic evidence as the first usable manifestation of the data. This is justified because the “live” image we view from the hard drive is really just “computer-speak” of 0’s and 1’s as opposed to an actual image.  Only when it is made viewable, it has any value.


Rule 1001 of Federal Rules of Evidence (Article X. Contents of Writings, Recordings, and Photographs) of USA defines an “original” (for electronically stored information) as any printout — or other output readable by sight {emphasis supplied]— if it accurately reflects the information. A “duplicate” is defined as a counterpart produced by a mechanical, photographic, chemical, electronic, or other equivalent process or technique that accurately reproduces the original.


In Srilanka, the Electronic Transactions Act No. 19 of 2006 has simplified proving of electronic records substantially and has truly become an enabler. Section 21(2) of the said Act provides for admissibility of data message, electronic record or communication, touching upon fact in issue or relevant fact and which was compiled, received or obtained during business, trade or profession or other regularly conducted activity.  The said provision places onus to establish reason to believe that such documents are either unreliable or inaccurate on the person making such claim.

Section 21(3) of the said Act draws a presumption in favour of the truth of information contained in a data message or electronic record and about the author of such document and also the genuineness of electronic signature, unless contrary is proved.  The onus is therefore again shifted to the person claiming the contrary.


By providing complicated processes for establishing the admissibility of secondary evidence of electronic records under Section 65A and 65B, the IT Act instead of enabling IT revolution, has now become the obstacle. The convoluted processes have created unforeseen complications. Several jurisdictions have moved on from complex alternatives to simple solutions of admissibility of electronic evidence unless rebutted. India remains harnessing to an unduly complex and strangely impossible regimen for proving electronic evidence.[42]

In US, as per the Rule 902 of Federal Rules of Evidence, certificate of a qualified person is enough to authenticate Electronic Evidence. Hence, we may consider amending Section 65B(4)© on the above lines, as operation of every electronic device is not managed by persons occupying a responsible official position.

Certification for the Electronic Record produced by defence: In Dilip Mali vs The State of Madhya Pradesh[43], the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dealing with the appeal preferred by the accused challenging the order of Additional Sessions Judge refusing to admit the original cassettes and CD submitted by the accused as defence evidence on the ground that certificate of competent authority was not produced by the counsel. The learned Sessions Judge also refused to issue a direction that the cassettes and CD be examined by an expert and submit his report to ensure that the CD and original cassettes were not tampered with and contains original recording. Hon’ble High Court directed the Additional Sessions Judge to send the CD to the expert and get it checked to ensure that no tampering was done in the cassettes and the CD and thereafter, the photographer and also the expert should be examined before the Court as defence witness. The Court should also ensure that the certificate issued by the operator of the camera should fulfill requirement of section 65B(2) & 65B(4) of Evidence Act.

Way Forward:

Where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device: In Shafhi Mohammad v. the State of Himachal Pradesh[44], Hon’ble Supreme Court decided on the applicability of Sections 63 and 65 of the Evidence Act to the  situations where electronic evidence is produced by a party who is not in possession of a device. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it will be denial of justice to the person who is in possession of authentic evidence/witness but on account of manner of proving, such document is kept out of consideration by the court in absence of certificate under Section 65B(4) of the Evidence Act, which party producing cannot possibly secure. Thus, requirement of certificate under Section 65B(h) is not always mandatory. Accordingly, the Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that that the legal position on the subject on the admissibility of the electronic evidence, especially by a party who is not in possession of device from which the document is produced. Such party cannot be required to produce certificate under Section 65B(4) of the EvidenceAct. The applicability of requirement of certificate being procedural can be relaxed by Court wherever interest of justice so justifies. This judgement is significant because it clarified that “Reliability of the piece of evidence is certainly a matter to be determined in the facts and circumstances of a fact situation. However, threshold admissibility of an electronic evidencecannot be ruled out on any technicality if the same was relevant….If the electronic evidence is authentic and relevant the same can certainly be admitted subject to the Court being satisfied about its authenticity and procedure for its admissibility may depend on fact situation such as whether the person producing such evidence is in a position to furnish certificate under Section65B(h).” Thus, the above judgement had opened some of the doors that were closed by the Anvar. For example, in case of the email, the original (primary) document is in the server of the Service Provider. Hence, an affidavit by the person producing the same about its authenticity may be sufficient.

It is however important to note that the Supreme Court recently in  Arjun Panditrao Khotkar vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal and others[45] held that the judgement in Anvar P.V. case “is the law declared by this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act” and that the judgment in Shafhi Mohammad “do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore overruled.” The clarified as follows[46]:

“the required certificate under Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced. This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the “computer” happens to be a part of a “computer system” or “computer network” and it becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4). The last sentence in Anvar P.V. (supra) which reads as “…if an electronic record as such is used as primary evidence under Section 62 of the Evidence Act…” is thus clarified; it is to be read without the words “under Section 62 of the Evidence Act,…” With this clarification, the law stated in paragraph 24 of Anvar P.V. (supra) does not need to be revisited.”


In decisions delivered after the decision in Anvar, it was found that there are many cases where the court ruled otherwise (albeit at different stages) merely for the lack of certificate. In some of these cases, the conditions of authenticity could have been satisfied through other methods of proof. Legislature may consider the following propositions:

a. the alternate methods of proving authenticity/integrity of electronic records shall be open. Similarly, the person who is competent to certify shall be defined in broader terms.

b. The definition of authentic electronic record may be introduced in the IT Act on the following lines (as suggested by Stephen Mason[47]):

  1. The content of the data that a party relies upon has not changed from the moment it was created to the moment it is submitted as evidence.
  2. The data can be proven to be from the purported source.
  3. The technical and organizational evidence demonstrates the integrity of the data is trustworthy, 
and is therefore considered to be reliable.’

c. Section 65B of IEA may be redrafted on the lines of the provisions of UNICITRAL Model Laws.[48]

This Article is written by Shri Aramane Sai Manohar, Serving IPS officer borne on Madhya Pradesh Cadre and Shri Anup John, Serving IPS officer borne on Kerala Cadre.


[1] Tomaso Bruno v. State of U.P., (2015) 7 SCC 178: 2015 SCC OnLine SC 52 at page 191.

[2] Anvar P.V. v. P.K. Basheer, MANU/SC/0834/2014; AIR 2015 SC 180.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid, at Para 13

[5] State (NCT of Delhi) V. Navjot Sandhu, 2005 11 SCC 600.

[6] Anvar, at Para 22.

[7] Anvar, at Para 16.

[8] See: Rakesh Kumar v. State, 2009 SCC OnLine Del 2609; (2009) 163 DLT 658 at page 710.

[9] Rekha Sharma v Central Bureau of Investigation, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7796.

[10] Harpal Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 1 SCC 734; 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1293.

[11] Sanjay Singh Ramrao Chavan Vs. Dattatray Gulabrao Phalke, MANU/SC/0040/2015.

[12] Kishan Tripathi Vs. The State, MANU/DE/0434/2016.

[13] Manoj Kumar v. State of Karnataka, CRIMINAL APPEAL No.1419/2012, decided on 30 June 2015, Karnataka HC, available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/17649698/.

[14] Mr. Tarun Khanna v. State, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 8833; (2017) 241 DLT 346.

[15] New Delhi District Patiala House Courts, Delhi, Criminal Appeal No. 40/14 available at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/47940398/ last seen on 09/02/2018

[16] BSES Yamuna Power Ltd. v. Mohan Lal, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 8563.

[17] Jagdeo Singh v State, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 7229; 2015 IIIAD (Delhi) 268.

[18] Kundan Singh v State, 2015 SCC OnLine Del 13647.

[19] Mrs.Nidhi Kakkar v Munish Kakkar, 2011 SCC OnLine P&H 2599.

[20] Ark Shipping Co. Ltd. vs Grt Shipmanagement Pvt. Ltd., 2008 (1) ARBLR 317 Bom.

[21] Salman Salim Khan v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 6096.

[22] Paras Jain V. State of Rajasthan, 2015 SCC OnLine Raj 8331.

[23] Supra 20.

[24] Justice Kurian Joseph, Admissibility of Electronic Evidence, 2016 SCC Vol. 5 June 21, 2016 Part 4, (2016) 5 SCC J-1 at page J-8.

[25] Ankur Chawla V. Central Bureau of Investigation & Ors, 2014 SCC OnLine Del 6461.

[26] Supra 20.

[27] Shradha Shipping Co Pvt Ltd v Adhithri Trading Company, 2014 SCC OnLine Bom 2273 : 2015 Cri LJ (NOC 483) 158.

[28] Jagdeo Singh v State, 2015 IIIAD (Delhi) 268.

[29] Supra 27.

[30] Kalpesh V. Satra v. M/s. Ajanta Paper Centre and anr., 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 7034.

[31] Ibid.

[32] Anvar, at Para 13.

[33] Jaimin Jewelery Exports Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 1771; (2017) 3 Mah LJ 691; 2017 Cri LJ 3308at page 711.

[34] Supra 26.

[35] Supra 27.

[36] Ibid.

[37] Consultation Paper on Documentary and Electronic Evidence, Third Programme of Law Reform 2008-2014, Project 7, Law Reform Commission, Ireland, December 2009, available at http://www.lawreform.ie/_fileupload/consultation%20papers/cpDocumentaryandElectronicEvidence.pdf, last accessed on 09/02/2018.

[38] Supra 27.

[39] https://www.naavi.org/wp/section-65b-explained/, last accessed on 09/02/2018.

[40] Supra 41.

[41] United Nations Convention on the Use of Electronic Communications in International Contracts, United Nations, New York, 2007, p52.

[42] Technology Laws Decoded by N.S. Nappinai, LexisNexis, 2017, Chapter 5

[43] MP High Court in Dilip Mali v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, CRR 0730 of 2015 decided on 5.8.2015

[44] Shafhi Mohammad v. the State of Himachal Pradesh, 2018 SCC OnLine SC 56

[45] SC in the Civil Appeal Nos. 20825-20826 OF 2017, order dated 14 July, 2020, available on at https://indiankanoon.org/doc/172105947/

[46] Ibid.

[47] Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (Lexis Nexis Butterworths, 
London 2007) 4.35.

[48] Supra 46.

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